The objective of this paper is to investigate whether coupling agricultural loans with micro-level and meso-level drought index insurance can stimulate the demand and supply of credit and increase technology adoption.
Observations of smallholder farmer inefficiency often reflect failure to control for nature. An example would be Ivorien rice farmers effected on their production frontier once inconsistent control for soils, rain, and pests are involved. So perhaps a non-uptake adoption is optimal as well? This presentation is based on the AMA Innovation Lab projects for the Mind the Gap Workshop.
This presentation is based on the AMA Innovation Lab projects throughout Africa. This research seeks to explore the growing gap between the rural poor farmers of Africa and their barriers relating to adopting new technologies.
To combat poverty traps, policies are passed to change the investment behavior of the poor. This presentation is based on the AMA Innovation Lab projects for the Conference on the Economics of Asset Dynamics and Poverty Traps.
This presentation took place at George Washington University, United States on November 6, 2014 describing how poor market integration in African markets result in barriers to building market linkages.
This paper focuses on multiple financial market failures – emphasising its heretofore underappreciated testable implications, including specific behaviours that are rational only in the presence of a poverty trap.
In this paper we use panel data on horticultural growers in Nicaragua to address the determinants of adoption into the supermarket channel, the determinants of “duration” as supermarket suppliers, and the effect of time to adoption and duration on farm capital and farm technology choice.
We explore whether farm land and non-land assets determine the participation of tomato growers in modern markets in Nicaragua, and how farmers’ duration as supermarket suppliers affects their farm capital accumulation and technology.
Though widely heralded, this effort to create rents in an otherwise competitive market is unlikely to succeed. By analyzing two ways in which the mechanism is undermined by arbitrage: over-certification and quality-invariant pricing.